Review Archives - China Books Review

Nation and narration

Review of Why Fiction Matters in Contemporary China by David Der-wei Wang. Brandeis, 2020.

Fiction has been integral to China’s pursuit of reinvention since the waning days of the Qing dynasty. In fiction, revolutionary-era thinkers such as Liang Qichao saw it as a means to “transform the mentality and morale of the Chinese people.” While one’s nation is a galvanizing lodestar for writers everywhere, in China there remains no subject as important as the country itself. There, Harvard’s David Der-wei Wang explains, fiction takes on relatively greater weight as an act of fabulation as opposed to fabrication. This allows it to serve as a vehicle for “both a continuation of and an intervention in history.”

Mao, and his Party, recognized that in the mastery of narrative there is the basis for a claim to legitimacy. Such mastery presents an opportunity not only to articulate but realize world-making ambitions. Thus, when Xi Jinping in 2013 exhorted his nation to “tell the good China story,” Wang sees more than propaganda at work, arguing it “deserves a serious inquiry into its cultural logic and political potential.” The “China Dream” and “community of common destiny” constitute the arc of a narrative Xi is inviting, and at times coercing, the world to fulfill. They are a belated recognition of the limits of technocratic targets to inspire.

Mixed legacy

Review of The Last Kings of Shanghai: The Rival Jewish Dynasties that Helped Create Modern China by Jonathan Kaufman. Viking, 2020.

Whatever else may give them cause for dispute, China and the world will always have the majesty of Shanghai to agree upon. Two families, the Sassoons and Kadoories, would be as instrumental as any in delivering Shanghai’s destiny “as the permanent emporium of trade between [China] and all nations of the world,” that a colonial newspaper once foresaw. From a role in the founding of banking giant HSBC to building the legendary Cathay Hotel on the Bund, their legacy is palpable.

So too is the sense of moral ambiguity that pervades this history. While in some ways progressive for their era towards Chinese, the families were complicit in the ravages of the opium trade. At the same time that the two clans kept the Chinese at the periphery of their world, the British elite kept the families (if not their largesse) at a remove from theirs on account of their faith. The families’ role in saving thousands of Jews who sought refuge from Nazi persecution would be among their greatest legacy.

Buying time

Review of Welfare for Autocrats: How Social Assistance in China Cares for its Rulers by Jennifer Pan. Oxford, 2020.

Mixing qualitative and novel quantitative methods, Stanford’s Jennifer Pan offers an illuminating case study of the logic governing China’s party-state and its people’s relationship to it. The focus of her study is Dibao, a minimum income program, which has been partially coopted in the interests of the government’s obsession with “stability maintenance.”

Contrary to perceptions of China as unforgiving to those guilty of “obstructing social order” – the euphemistic and largest annual category of prosecutions – the state is often willing to bargain with those who threaten small-scale challenges to its authority. One means of doing so is prioritizing the provision of benefits to individuals who have run afoul of the government. The intent is to both inculcate a dependence on the government that may temper future disruptions and create a pretext for surveillance in the guise of welfare calls. In one experiment, Pan finds that governments are more likely to respond to online requests for assistance that include a vague allusion to collective action than those which do not.

Competitive coexistence

Review of Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia by David Shambaugh. Oxford, 2020.

Southeast Asia is framed as the front line of America and China’s global competition. That is, to some degree, self-serving for the region, whose countries seek to balance China’s economic opportunities with American security guarantees. But why this dynamic must be framed as a competition at all, for reasons other than for the sake of competition itself, is an elusive subject in a new survey of the region.

The ten nations of Southeast Asia, which collectively possess a population of more than 600 million and an economy comparable to France, are highly diverse, encompassing archipelagos and a city-state, the very rich and very poor, secular states as well as the world’s largest Muslim nation. Geographically, Southeast Asia bestrides a crucial choke point in global trade. Considerable naval resources have been devoted to ensuring freedom of navigation and preventing the denial of access should conflict arise; China has also invested aggressively in infrastructure in the region that allow it to bypass the strait.

It would be one thing if American and Chinese competition were limited to the sea; but it extends well inland, taking on a wide array of economic and diplomatic dimensions whose rationale, at least for the United States, merits scrutiny. For Beijing, the desire to assure the stability of its immediate region is clear and the region’s economic potential an added bonus. But for the United States, which does not share China’s mercantilist outlook, and which could conceivably achieve its strategic objectives with a far narrower commitment of resources, why need this be a competition at all?

Red before green

Review of China Goes Green: Coercive Environmentalism for a Troubled Planet by Yifei Li and Judith Shapiro. Polity, 2020.

One can fault China’s leaders for many things, but rarely for lack of a plan. Xi Jinping’s declaration before a virtual convening of the UN General Assembly this fall that the country would aim for carbon neutrality by 2060 is a case in point. While the target’s ambition was matched by the absence of meaningful detail about how it would be reached, China’s commitment nonetheless raised global hopes that the world may yet avert environmental catastrophe. That is because of the perception that China’s authoritarian political system is uniquely able to take decisive and effective action.

But as the environmental researchers Judith Shapiro and Yifei Li explain in their new book, China Goes Green, this perception is largely unwarranted. Yes, the Party has nominally embraced environmentalism, but often as a means to “strengthen the authority and reach of the state” and, frequently, with negative environmental consequences.

Not yet, possibly never

Review of Has China Won: the Chinese Challenge to American Primacy by Kishore Mahbubani. Public Affairs, 2020.

“Singapore has to take the world as it is; it is too small to change it,” the city-state’s late founding father Lee Kuan Yew wrote. But that belies how Singapore’s geostrategic and symbolic importance, reputation for strong governance, and clear-eyed diplomacy have long earned it the respect and ability to play truth-teller to both Washington and Beijing.

Its status as a majority ethnic Chinese democracy, security partner with the United States, and its position along the most important strait in the global economy, assure it an important role in the US-China contest. In that capacity, Singapore is consistently principled, fiercely insistent on its own autonomy, an advocate for a rules-based order on which its status as an economic hub is built, and a masterful balancer between the United States and China.

Lively, if not free

Review of Voices from the Chinese Century, edited by Timothy Cheek, David Ownby, and Joshua Fogel. Columbia, 2019.

Perhaps what is most telling about this anthology of contemporary Chinese intellectuals is how preoccupied its writers are with the ghosts of China’s past, and less with the future the title of Voices from the Chinese Century would suggest. Indeed, the writer whose insights are most incisive is not a contributor at all, but Lu Xun via quotation.

“Whatever kind of citizen you have,” one contributor paraphrases Xun, “that will be the kind of government you have.” The observation also functions as an implicit criticism of this anthology, largely removed from the country’s people and social transformations. The anthology’s editors acknowledge that “academic public intellectuals … hardly describe the entire population of China’s lively, if not free, public sphere.” But the great divergence in perspectives nonetheless captured within its pages do reflect the many possible trajectories for China’s future. And the one conclusion the authors implicitly share, that the status quo cannot hold, affirms that for all its progress, China’s future remains fragile.

A kaleidoscopic history

Review of The Shenzhen Experiment: the Story of China’s Instant City by Juan Du. Harvard University Press, 2020.

What is a great city without an audacious myth, a myth that shapes the ethos of its people, beckons newcomers to it, and keeps its inhabitants in its thrall? While outside of China, Shenzhen, among its many superlatives, may be the world’s most important yet least known city, within contemporary China, the power of its myth rivals that of Beijing or Shanghai.

The myth of Shenzhen, a city of twelve million just north of Hong Kong, arises not from its positioning as China’s Silicon Valley. Indeed, the world-shaping influence of companies such as telecommunications company Huawei, web giant Tencent, or electric car manufacturer BYD is very much real. Instead, the myth of Shenzhen arises from its role as a special economic zone, the symbol of China’s Reform and Opening Up and swift development. From nothing more than a fishing village, the myth goes, Shenzhen became an instant city and a validation of the Communist Party’s vision and authoritarian political model.

Into the dark

Review of Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping by Roger Faligot. Hurst, 2019, and Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer by Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil. Naval Institute Press, 2019.

“What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge … hence the use of spies,” Sun Tzu observed. Two fascinating new books add to our understanding of the history and methods of China’s intelligence services.

The Chinese Communist Party’s intelligence apparatus was heavily shaped by the civil war with the nationalist KMT for control of the country. CCP intelligence, in the form of the Special Operations Work Department, was created following the Party’s near destruction in a vicious 1927 crackdown. But within just four years, CCP intelligence had infiltrated the KMT so effectively that it was able to warn against multiple subsequent crackdowns, saving the lives of future leaders such as Zhou Enlai, and allowing the party to fight on to victory.

Lost up north

Review of Living with China: A Middle Power Finds Its Way, by Wendy Dobson. University of Toronto Press, 2019.

China’s former premier once criticized his country’s economy as “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.” Regrettably, it can also serve as a succinct summary of the worldview, focus, recommendations, and implications of a new book on Canada’s relationship with China.

Wendy Dobson, a Canadian academic specializing in economic analysis and policy, writes amid a trying moment in Canada-China relations. It is not enough that Canada’s largest trading partner, the United States, is engaged in a broad-ranging economic conflict, with its second largest partner, China. Since December 2018, when Canada honored a US request and arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, China has responded with fierce political and economic retaliation. Coinciding with revelations about China’s efforts to influence and interfere with Canadian institutions and society, there has been a marked drop in favorable Canadian attitudes about Beijing.

But even before the deterioration in ties, recognition was emerging in Canada, as it has in other Western middle powers such as Australia and New Zealand, that the country needed to reevaluate its relationship with China as it appeared to no longer be on the path of liberalization.

For a book that declares boldly in its opening pages that Canada “lacks a China strategy,” it subsequently fails to deliver. Instead, all but the final chapter of this slim volume is devoted to Chinese politics in the Xi era, its economy, and growing international ambitions. None of this analysis surpasses other treatments on the topics nor offers a Canadian lens with which to appreciate their implications.

Despite acknowledging all that has changed in the relationship, and perhaps most critically within China itself under Xi Jinping, Dobson nonetheless maintains the usual sloganeering of a strategy based on “mutual respect, accommodation, and genuine discussion of differences in values and institutions.” But what if, as all evidence suggests, China is unwilling to engage on any of those terms?

Unsurprising not because of Dobson’s background, but the book’s nominally broader ambitions, is the emphasis on trade. Specifically, now that a comprehensive free trade agreement Canada had pursued is no longer viable, she advocates for narrower sectoral agreements. But Dobson never satisfyingly explains why the appropriate response to a country to which Canada is already at risk of economic coercion is to increase opportunities for that coercion even more. In another instance, that she takes an agreement to not commit state-directed cyberattacks for something other than what it is – empty – is a stunning display of naivete given that Australia’s parliament and main political parties were subject to such an attack in May.

These failures only underscore Dobson’s motivation that middle powers need new China strategies that also take into account a relatively less powerful and, regrettably, less dependable, United States. Yet, declarations that “Canada will need to continue to find a way to live with China by carrying through its commitment to promote trade, investment, security, and other common interests, seeking to engage Communist Party officials and civil society in the pursuit of global and long-term interests, while standing up for its values” is a near exact inversion of what should be any nation’s priorities.

The rush to return to the status quo ante is one that other Canadians are rightfully reconsidering. David Mulroney, a former Canadian ambassador to China, has written that “given the undeniable evidence of China’s hostility to core Canadian interests, starting with the safety of our citizens, we urgently need to reconsider our approach.” He challenges the guiding “fictions” of Canada’s approach to China that is premised on the notion of a China that, among other things, is inherently peaceful, does not interfere in other countries’ affairs, and bestows trade as a favor on friendly nations.

Instead of prioritizing bilateral engagement, middle powers such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, ought to refocus their attention on strengthening their alliances and consider a joint approach to China. Together, they are the world’s fourth largest economy after the US, EU, and China and rank similarly in terms of defense spending. Their collective strength and values would make it harder for China to continue its coercive course.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to read in the appointment as the next Canadian ambassador to China of Dominic Barton, former managing director of the consultancy McKinsey & Company, with which this reviewer has also been affiliated, anything other than an attempt to return to doing business, whatever the costs to Canada’s values and autonomy. This book will be an all too useful guide on that mistaken mission.